1	UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK		
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4	IN RE:	. Case No. 05-18439-MG	
5	WILLIAM ROBERT PAWSON,	New York, New YorkWednesday, August 13, 2008	
6	Debtor.	. 10:02 a.m.	
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8	TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING BEFORE THE HONORABLE MARTIN GLENN		
9	UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE		
10	APPEARANCES:		
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18	(Appearances continued)		
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(Proceedings commence at 10:02 a.m.) 1 THE COURT: All right. Please be seated. We're 2 here in In Re William Robert Pawson. It's Number 05-18439. 3 It's the hearing with respect to a proposed settlement of the 4 debtor's cross-motion for sanctions. 5 Counsel, please make your appearances. 6 MR. SHAEV: David B. Shaev for the debtor, Your 7 Honor. 8 THE COURT: Good morning, Mr. Shaev. 9 MR. LESNIAK: Good morning, Your Honor. Edward 10 Lesniak for JPMorgan Chase Bank. Also present in the 11 courtroom, Your Honor, from JPMorgan Chase Bank is Mr. Jim 12 Berg (phonetic), who is a vice president and assistant 13 general counsel. THE COURT: Good morning, Mr. Lesniak and Mr. Berg. 15 MR. WIENER: Edward Wiener for JPMorgan Chase Bank 16 from Stein, Wiener & Roth. 17 THE COURT: All right, Mr. Wiener. 18 MR. VELEZ-RIVERA: Good morning, Your Honor. Andrew 19 Velez-Rivera for the United States Trustee. 20 THE COURT: Good morning, Mr. Velez-Rivera. 21 MS. KAVA: (Via telephone) Jody Kava for the 22 23 Chapter 13 trustee. THE COURT: Good morning, Ms. Kava. 24

MS. KAVA: Thank you for letting me appear by

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Colloquy

telephone, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Certainly.

All right. This matter was on the calendar last Thursday, a regular Chapter 13 day. There may have been some confusion whether the matter was going to be on or not. A proposed stipulated order had been provided to the Court in advance of the hearing that would have resolved the crossmotion for sanctions. It was a cross-motion to JPMorgan Chase's motion to lift the automatic stay.

During the hearing last Thursday, Mr. Shaev appeared, and I indicated on the record that I was not prepared to approve the stipulated order. And I cited -- and there is a copy of the transcript that's on -- you can all have a seat, please. I cited in the record a copy of Judge Lynch's decision in the District Court in Geltzer v. Anderson Worldwide, which is at 2007 WL, 273526. It's a January 2007 decision when he declined to approve a Rule 9019 motion to approve a settlement between Robert Geltzer, a Chapter 7 trustee, and Anderson Worldwide and Arthur Anderson in connection with Asia Global Crossing.

And I also, I believe, mentioned on the record my prior decision in <u>In Re Food Management Group, LLC</u>, which is at 359 BR 543, a 2007 decision which involved 11 U.S.C. Section 107, which is the Bankruptcy Code section that deals with sealing.

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Motion I indicated on the record that -- and entered an 1 order after the hearing last Thursday setting the matter for 2 hearing today. Other than Mr. Lesniak's pro hac vice 3 application, there were no other filings that relate to the 4 proposed settlement. 5 Mr. Shaev, do you want to be heard? 6 MR. SHAEV: Yes, Your Honor. Just in general, the 7 Court is well aware of the facts that led to this cross-8 motion. But we've had very fruitful discussions very quickly 9 in this matter, and Chase did step up rather quickly to 10 settle this to, hopefully, mitigate against the damages they owe to my client. 12 Part of the settlement is a correction of their 1.3 credit reports and a statement of their mortgage. There's a 15

whole slew of things that are very important to my client and myself on behalf of the client. And my worry is that my clients would be prejudiced in some fashion if this matter is not quickly brought to conclusion.

THE COURT: Right. Thank you, Mr. Shaev.

Who wants to speak on behalf of Chase?

MR. LESNIAK: I would like to, Your Honor.

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THE COURT: Go ahead, Mr. Lesniak.

MR. LESNIAK: Thank you, Your Honor. And thank you for so quickly executing my petition to be heard pro hac

vice. Things are moving pretty quickly in this matter, and I appreciate that. It's an honor to be here to address you on this.

I thought it would be helpful, if I could, to take a moment to just make it crystal clear what exactly led to this court hearing and what we are asking the Court to do and what we are not asking the Court to do.

When this matter first came to Chase's attention, Chase asked me to get involved. We quickly became involved and had very fruitful, very professional, very respectful negotiations with Mr. Shaev. And we were very quickly able to reach a resolution of the cross-motion that's pending. And that led to a settlement agreement.

Mr. Shaev --

THE COURT: Not presented by a Rule 9019 --

MR. LESNIAK: No, Your Honor --

THE COURT: It was resolved by a --

MR. LESNIAK: I will get to that, Your Honor, but that's correct. It's not a 9019, it's not a trustee's motion, it's not brought in any fiduciary capacity. We consider the matter to be a private matter between Chase and the debtor. This concerns an action that was taken by Chase to which the debtor objected, a post-petition action. The debtor said, I have a claim here because of this conduct. And whether that's accurate or not, we decided to reach a

settlement of it which really only affects two parties: Chase and the debtor.

As I understand it, this is a 100 percent plan. There are no payments being made to Chase in the Chapter 13 plan. It seems to me that the Chapter 13 trustee would have no apparent interest in this matter. It's purely a matter between Chase and the debtor.

Now, to get to this point, as part of the settlement, Mr. Shaev said, okay, Chase is agreeing to do certain things I want, certain things that are set out in the proposed stipulated order. And he said to me quite honestly, we want more than just Chase's agreement, we would like you to submit this to -- we'd like this submitted to the Bankruptcy Court and have the force and effect of a Court order. And we said, okay, we will agree to that.

So what we were asking the Court to do is, in aid of a settlement that is very favorable to the debtor, to order Chase to do certain things that are part of the settlement agreement. We do not feel, because there's certainly not a 9019 motion, it's not a 4001 motion that's perhaps in settlement of a relief of stay issue. The motion for relief of stay has been withdrawn, was withdrawn back in July. So it's not anything that requires Court approval. So we are not by this order asking the Court to approve the settlement or to pass on the fairness of the settlement.

We are not asking the Court to seal the settlement because we are not asking to file it.

THE COURT: Well, you don't have anything in the order that you'd care about sealing. You left that out.

MR. LESNIAK: Well, Judge, because we're not -- to ask something be put under seal would be -- something would be filed. We do not intend to file the settlement agreement. So there's no reason to --

asking for me to sign a stipulated order. You're asking for the Court to approve a stipulated order that has certain terms that require Chase to do certain things with respect to the debtor. So you're looking for the Court's imprimatur on partially disclosed terms of a settlement.

MR. LESNIAK: Well, it's at the debtor's request. Yes, Your Honor. We are asking the Court to order Chase to do certain things.

THE COURT: See, Mr. Lesniak, and I'll be very candid; when I saw the cross-motion and I read the motion to lift the automatic stay, which unlike in the <u>Schuessler</u> case before Judge Morris, Chase, I think, had the good sense to withdraw the lift-stay motion pretty quickly here.

But I reviewed the lift-stay motion, I reviewed the cross-motion, and I think I said this on the record last week, that I came very close to entering an order to show

cause why Chase and its counsel of record, which was not you, should not be sanctioned without regard to whether Mr. Shaev was able to work out matters between his client and Chase. The Court has a very strong interest in any pleadings filed in this court, particularly motions to lift stay, that ask for affirmative relief from the Court. Simply withdrawing a motion -- and I have no basis on which to decide now whether the motion was well taken or not well taken.

But when you file a motion that asks for affirmative relief from the Court, counsel who signs the motion undertakes certain obligations to the Court. Certainly, the signature on the motion and any supporting papers immediately under 9011 imposes obligations on the parties filing the motion. The Court's inherent power comes into play. A whole host of issues come into play.

So I was certainly -- before Mr. Shaev -- and, certainly, Mr. Shaev had attached Judge Morris's decision in Schuessler to his cross-motion. I was very familiar with the Schuessler decision, as I think all of my colleagues in the Southern District of New York are very familiar with it.

And I didn't -- I figured, well, the motion will come on for hearing -- the cross-motion will come on for hearing and I wanted to hear what was going to be said at that time. Then I was advised that -- before I even saw the stipulated order that a settlement of the cross-motion had

been reached, that Mr. Shaev had declined initially to withdraw the cross-motion, that a settlement had been reached. It was in the form presented.

I'm certainly open to considering whether to approve a settlement, but as I indicated last week, my signature does not go on any order in this case that I don't know all the terms, unless you file a motion under 107(b) to seal. Since none has been filed, I guess I don't have reason to rule on it. But I did call Mr. Shaev's attention, and I'm sure you've seen the transcript from last week, to Judge Lynch's decision, which is -- the only thing that distinguishes this case from Anderson Worldwide is that, here, you didn't file a 9019, you simply asked for me to sign a stipulated order. And I'm not sure that that's appropriate.

MR. LESNIAK: Your Honor, if I may respond to that -

THE COURT: Go ahead, Mr. Lesniak. Go ahead.

MR. LESNIAK: Those are excellent points, Judge, and I would like to have an opportunity to respond to them.

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. LESNIAK: In terms of the last point you raised, there is language at the beginning of the <u>Geltzer</u> case which specifically discusses that, under normal circumstances, settlements between parties that only affect those parties are generally not a matter for public record.

There is also some language that says that the Court takes a little bit more interest when there is a so-ordered judgment. To the extent this falls within that realm, we appreciate that. And our settlement agreement allows for us to disclose the settlement agreement in camera. We have a confidentiality agreement, however, that would preclude us, at this stage, from filing it in the public records.

So we are certainly not trying to hide the agreement from this Court.

THE COURT: That was true in <u>Geltzer</u> as well, and Judge Lynch -- the parties were willing to show the agreement to Judge Lynch in camera, and he didn't have any trouble disposing of that argument.

MR. LESNIAK: I understand that, Judge. But I believe that the circumstances -- and I would suggest that the circumstances are very different. In 9019 -- and Geltzer was a 9019 motion that was made by a trustee who was settling a pre-petition claim, the results of which would affect how much was paid out to numerous creditors. So the Court was in the position -- and I certainly understand the Geltzer case and really agree with it. How can a judge be expected to approve a settlement that affects a large group of people without knowing what the dollar amount is?

That is distinguishable from this particular case where the only two parties involved are Chase and the debtor,

and Mr. Pawson. So we believe that it's a very different circumstance.

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We are not asking the Court to approve the settlement. The matters that were raised that we're asking the Court to order are those things that the debtor felt strongly about needing Court protection on, and so we agreed to do that in aid of the debtor's request and in getting this settlement done. So I think there is a significant distinction between this case and the 9019 situation addressed in that particular -- in the Geltzer case.

And as I say, we are perfectly amenable to disclosing the agreement to the Court in chambers so you can satisfy yourself that it's a settlement that's good for the debtor. We've probably disclosed in the Court order about ninety percent of the terms of the settlement, so there's not a lot left, but you're welcome to see that. That was our understanding with the debtor. And we would Certainly live by that.

As for the rule to show cause situation, Judge, nothing that we've -- that we were doing in connection with the settlement is intended in any way, nor could it affect the Court's ability to take whatever action it felt appropriate. We understand that you have that power, and if you choose to exercise that under these particular facts and circumstances, that's the Court's determination and we would

address it at that time.

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But other than that, Judge, I don't think it would be fair for me to make any comment on the underlying facts because from what I'm hearing, it may ultimately go to an evidentiary hearing. So I don't think I can comment any further on it.

THE COURT: Well, I'm not sure I agree with that last statement because I fully intended -- if you or someone else had appeared last Thursday, I fully intended to ask about the underlying facts and circumstances here, and I'm going to do that right now.

MR. LESNIAK: Okay.

THE COURT: And either you or -- is it Mr. Wiener or 13 14

MR. WIENER: Mr. Wiener. Mr. Wiener, your firm is counsel of record on --

MR. WIENER: That's correct.

THE COURT: All right. Your Honor, in Schuessler, what Judge Morris there was faced with was a debtor who had been making payments in a Chase branch, and at some point --I won't recount the whole history; it's a lengthy sixty-age opinion -- Chase declined to accept the payments in the branch for the reasons that Judge Morris explores.

I this matter, as I understand it, the debtor had been making payments online rather than bringing them into a

branch, and there was a history of making the payments online, which had been accepted until the two payments on which Mr. Wiener's firm moved to lift the stay, claiming that there were post-petition defaults that were, in fact, payments that had been attempted to be made but weren't accepted.

Tell me what Chase's policy is with respect to payments online. I, you know, read <u>Schuessler</u>. I understand they had some policy about not accepting payments in a branch. And I want to know what the policy is with respect to payments by a debtor online. The excuses that were given in <u>Schuessler</u> for not accepting them in the branch was, well, you know, an employee in a branch might violate the automatic stay by asking questions. Well, when you pay online, there's nobody to ask you questions. I mean, what's the policy? Why weren't — do you agree that the payments were not accepted online here?

MR. LESNIAK: Yes, Your Honor. There's a little more history to it as I understand it. Okay? And I want to make it clear that this is as I understand looking at the facts.

THE COURT: If Mr. Wiener needs to address it, he can. I'll let one -- you know, either one or both of you talk about it.

MR. LESNIAK: I'll address it, Judge, and --

THE COURT: Go ahead, Mr. Lesniak.

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$ LESNIAK: -- and subject to correction from Mr. Berg if I get anything wrong.

But as I understand it, after this case was filed,
Mr. Pawson was notified that payments would only be accepted
in a certain fashion. And that fashion included by check, I
believe by Western Union, but would not be accepted online.
Mr. Pawson bided by that from 2005 until sometime in 2007.

Then, in 2007, he tried to make an online payment, and contrary to the way the account should have been coded, the payment was allowed to go through. Mr. Pawson continued to make payments online thereafter until he became two months delinquent and, under its guidelines, Chase referred the matter out to a motion for relief from the stay.

THE COURT: Did he become two months delinquent, or did Chase reject two payments that he made? Mr. Shaev, in his objection and cross-motion, argued that the payments -- that looking at the payment history, the payments were timely, but were rejected -- the online payments, but the two payments were rejected.

MR. LESNIAK: That is not our position, Your Honor. The position is that the borrower, Mr. Pawson, was in fact two months delinquent at the point in time when Chase referred the matter out for the filing of a motion for relief.

Shortly thereafter, Mr. Pawson attempted to make a payment online, and that was rejected.

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After that, he tried to make another payment online, I believe the same day that the motion for relief was filed, on or about the same day that the motion for relief was filed. He then contacted Chase -- I think on the 24th of June he contacted Chase. Chase informed him that payments would not be accepted online because the matter had been referred out to counsel for a motion for relief.

The next day, Chase received a check, on the 25th of June, I believe, Chase received a check for the two months delinquent. And, subsequently, Chase withdrew its motion for relief because the account had then been brought current.

And my understanding is the account is presently current -- in a current status.

So there's some fluidity there where the matter is referred out, and then the borrower sends payment, and there's some reaction time involved in making sure those payments are recognized, and then withdrawing the motion, which Chase did. When the debtor came current, Chase withdrew the motion.

It was not a situation where the failure to accept an online payment caused the borrower to go two months in default. He was two months in default at the time he tried to make the first online payment that was rejected.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Lesniak.

MR. LESNIAK: Thank you.

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THE COURT: Mr. Wiener, I have some questions for you. I take it the notary who notarized various documents in this case works in your office?

MR. WIENER: Your Honor, that actually is an issue that I was going to address when Mr. Lesniak was finished. That was clearly a scrivener's error, if you were, as to what happened in the case.

The affidavit was forwarded to Chase, it was executed by an officer of Chase in Ohio --

THE COURT: Mr. Keete (phonetic)?

MR. WIENER: Mr. Keete. Notarized in Ohio, and transmitted back to us. Our office -- or instead of scanning in the signed sheet with the affidavit and the notary on it, as a policy of putting on the "S" and the signature and the name. And in this particular case, the paralegal transcribed the notary information from the individual who mailed out the motion for relief. If you look at the name on the affidavit of service for the motion for relief, it is the same incorrect notary on the affidavit.

THE COURT: I looked at that.

MR. WIENER: And, clearly, it was an error. But there was no -- the affidavits were all pre-signed according -- not pre-signed. They were all signed, forwarded back to

us, and then filed in accordance with the Court's rules. It was a transcription error, and our apologies to the Court for doing that. But there was nothing done improper in terms of having pre-signed affidavits or -

order requires was included. I looked at it again this morning. The online -- when it's filed on ECF, it didn't have a signature or even the slash with a signature. Now it may have been that the actual -- let me look in the file here and see whether the one in the file -- it may be that what's online is not what's in the file. Just give me a second.

(The Court reviews documents.)

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THE COURT: No, there is a signed one in the file. When I looked online this morning, the one that was online didn't have a signature. And that, of course, shows the Columbus, Ohio --

MR. WIENER: Correct.

THE COURT: Mr. Shaev made much of the -- that overstates it. Mr. Shaev in his objection and cross-motion pointed out that your -- I assume it's your associate who signed a declaration or an affidavit that was part of your moving papers that has the boilerplate language about lack of adequate protection for this million-dollar apartment with a two-hundred-thousand-dollar loan that may or may not have been two months in arrears. And what basis did she have to

make the statements that she made in her affidavit?

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MR. WIENER: Well, Judge, clearly, there does appear to be sufficient equity in this property. There's a tremendous amount of equity.

THE COURT: I would think so.

MR. WIENER: We're not going to argue that. But I think we also need to look at -- this is not a Chapter 7.

This is a Chapter 13. And I think that the basis for seeking the relief here was the disputed payments and the disputed arrears and whether, in fact, that they were in arrears.

THE COURT: None of that, of course, was revealed to the Court until Mr. Shaev filed his objection.

I mean, the thing -- Mr. Wiener, Mr. Lesniak, I mean, the thing that most bothers me about this is this debtor has very able counsel. Mr. Shaev appears before me regularly on the Court's Chapter 13 calendar. And he is a very able lawyer who represents his clients to the fullest and protects their rights and is very vigorous in protecting their rights.

What I worry about is this very long lift-stay calendar I have every two weeks with many pro se debtors, or some represented by counsel who, for whatever reason, are not as tenacious or vigorous in their defense of their clients as Mr. Shaev is for his. And so, you know, when Judge Morris early in her opinion said, this opinion serves as a warning,

the warning seems to have been unheeded.

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If someone in your office before filing this motion had looked at the ECF docket and seen that Mr. Shaev was counsel of record and picked up the phone and called Mr. Shaev and said, you know, we're about to file a motion to lift the automatic stay because two payments in arrears, before we file the motion can you tell me what the situation is, Mr. Shaev would have undoubtedly very quickly gotten back to you and said, no, no, no, here is the explanation, the client sought to make the payments online, they were rejected, or let me see -- you know, send me a copy of the payment history, let's look at it and figure it out.

This motion should never have been filed. And the statements that were made in support of the motion never should have been made. And when Judge Morris, in <u>Schuessler</u>, in the strongest possible terms — let me find it. It's on Page 76 of the — Judge Morris's decision that appears online. It's not the <u>Westlaw</u> version, but Judge Morris says on Page 6, quote:

"A creditor's inattentiveness can be just as abusive of process as an intentional act of misconduct.

Under the facts in this case, the actions of the mortgage servicer constituted an abuse of process that this Court has a duty to rectify pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Section 105(a), regardless of whether or not

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the abuse is the result of intentional conduct.

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of facts set forth below are intended to serve as a

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warning to all creditors that, in this Court's view,

This lengthy introduction and the Court's findings

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the conduct of the mortgage servicer in this case,

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including acts that were taken and not taken by its

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employees, agents and attorneys constituting abuse

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I'll end the quote there.

of process."

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So in the strongest possible terms, Judge Morris

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certainly put Chase on notice that -- and I'm not saying the

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conduct here -- I haven't had an evidentiary hearing --

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whether the facts here are the same as in $\underline{Schuessler}$, I'm not

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prepared to say at this point. But I can't fathom why lift-

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stay motions get filed in a case like this without somebody

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picking up the phone and calling counsel of record and

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alerting them.

The only possible reason I see is that this machine

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spits out motions and counsel get paid for making motions,

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not for making a phone call to the debtor's counsel. And,

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hence, the Court finds on its docket still another lift-stay

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motion that never should have been made.

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Even if I accept Mr. Lesniak's representations as to

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the facts as to whether this debtor was two months in arrears

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when the online payments were rejected or not, once the

debtor -- I mean, it seems a matter of record that the debtor attempted to make the payments online. Whether they were timely or not, I don't have to decide for now. I mean, I can't fathom it.

MR. LESNIAK: Your Honor, may I respond to that?

THE COURT: Go ahead, Mr. Lesniak.

MR. LESNIAK: Just a couple of things, Judge, because the concerns are obviously very legitimate ones, and Chase is very well aware of those concerns in the <u>Schuessler</u> case.

A couple of points I would like to make. The Court is absolutely correct, and we've had discussions about that this morning, that it would have been a good idea to pick up the phone and call Mr. Shaev. However, in fairness to Chase, I would just also like to point out that it probably would have been a good idea for Mr. Shaev to pick up the phone and call Chase's counsel and say, by the way, do you know my client just sent in two payments. So I do think it's a two-way street that I would ask the Court to be mindful of.

THE COURT: Chase is the one who filed the motion to lift the automatic stay. Don't put it on Mr. Shaev's shoulders.

MR. LESNIAK: I'm not -- I'm not putting it on his shoulders, Judge.

THE COURT: Did he know you were going to file --

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you didn't do it personally, I understand. Your firm is 1 national counsel to Chase. Do I understand that correctly? 2 MR. LESNIAK: Yes, Your Honor. 3 THE COURT: And Mr. Wiener's firm is local counsel? 4 MR. LESNIAK: Is the local counsel. 5 THE COURT: Did your firm prepare the papers, or Mr. 6 Wiener's firm? 7 MR. LESNIAK: No, we don't prepare those, Judge. 8 THE COURT: All right. 9 MR. LESNIAK: But in addition to that, Chase is very 10 mindful of these concerns. And Chase is taking steps to address these specific concerns. 12 Now Chase services over three million mortgages. So 1.3 sometimes the boat moves a little slower than we'd like. But Chase is taking steps to address this, and I can be specific. 15 First, Chase does a lot of loan servicing. And it 16 is negotiating with its investors to change the guidelines 17 that it is obligated in its servicing agreements to follow 18 with respect to filing motions for relief. The reason Chase 19 files the motion when the debtor is two months behind is 2.0 because that's what required of it by its investors when it's 21 servicing loans. 22 Chase is negotiating to extend that period out to 23 three or four months behind so we have a clearer record of

default to avoid these types of situations. Point Number 1.

THE COURT: That wouldn't solve a problem about rejected payments.

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MR. LESNIAK: It wouldn't, Judge. But I think you're -- the situation you have here is when you're one or two months behind, that may be easier to catch up. I think when you fall three or four months behind, it's a better indication that this borrower is not able to keep current. And so we would -- Chase is negotiating to extend out that time frame so you don't have these perfect storm situations where somebody is trying to send you the payment, or they're sending you the payment at the same time that you're filing the motion.

Point Number 2: Chase has hired an in-house counsel whose job is specifically to review all of the motions filed in New York, all of the motions for relief after they're prepared by local counsel so that there is another set of attorneys' eyes in-house at Chase. Unfortunately, that person was not in place and functioning yet at the time this matter was -- came up. But Chase is looking to address these situations so we don't have another situation that causes the Court this type of concern.

THE COURT: Mr. Wiener's papers are perfectly fine on their face. It's only if one goes behind them -- I mean, what is -- you know, if in-house -- what was in-house counsel supposed to do when they looked at -- what would they do if

they looked at Mr. Wiener's papers? I mean, the papers look proper. It's only when you find out the background and you find out that two payments online were rejected -- whether it was when there was already a default, whether there was not a default is almost beside the point. It was certainly before the lift-stay motion was filed.

MR. LESNIAK: Well, that's the kind of information that in-house counsel would have access to, Judge: The customer service notes, the attempts to make payments online, knowing more currently exactly what is the situation on that particular day before the motion is filed.

So I think it would make a significant difference in trying to -- combining those two factors would make a significant difference in trying to address these types of situations.

THE COURT: Is that procedure in place currently?

MR. LESNIAK: That's my understanding, Your Honor.

Mr. Berg can address that. It was not at the time the <u>Pawson</u> matter was filed. That person was in the process of being hired. That person is in place now.

THE COURT: All right. Let me hear -- Ms. Kava, on the issue of confidentiality of the terms, do you want to be heard on that?

MS. KAVA: I just have a problem, Your Honor, with the fact -- what was said almost at the beginning of the

conversation, which was that this is just between two parties and the Chapter 13 trustee is not -- should not be involved at all. The Chapter 13 trustee is involved in every Chapter 13, and I think the trustee is entitled to all information that's available.

yourself, that's of course fine. But I have a hard time taking it that the Chapter 13 trustee should have no interest in this case. If the debtor is not making his mortgage payment, that's certainly an issue for the trustee. It goes to whether or not he's complying with his plan. So it's not a two-party dispute. The trustee is absolutely taking a very strong interest in this.

MR. SHAEV: Your Honor, may I?

THE COURT: Let me ask Mr. Velez-Rivera first, and then I'll give you a chance, Mr. Shaev.

MR. VELEZ-RIVERA: Thank you, Your Honor. I'll follow up on Ms. Kava's point, actually. It's one of the matters I desire to address with the Court.

The matter was actually brought to our office very recently. But we've reviewed the file this morning, and based on what we can see, the argument that this is a private matter is astonishing. Bankruptcy is, if nothing else, life in a fish bowl. My office hasn't seen either the proposed order which Your Honor has or the underlying settlement

agreement.

THE COURT: The only thing I have is a proposed stipulated order that -- and it's not online. It was provided to the Court last week before the hearing.

MR. VELEZ-RIVERA: We also disagree vehemently with the premise that this matter affects only two parties. As Ms. Kava said, the Chapter 13 trustee would be the third party, and with the integrity of the bankruptcy process overwhelmingly at issue, nothing else in the entire bankruptcy system is also a participant in the proceedings, not to mention my own client.

THE COURT: Yeah, I would -- you know, 9019(a) -- people can address whether that applies here or not, but 9019(a) provides that on a motion -- quote:

"On motion by the trustee and after notice and a hearing, the Court may approve a compromise or settlement. Notice shall be given to creditors, the United States Trustee, the debtor, and indenture trustees as provided in Rule 2002, and to any other entity as the Court may direct."

So in any 9019 settlement, your office receives notice of it. It's not clear to me whether 9019, by its terms, applies here or not. I'm not prepared to -- no such motion was made here. It is a question I have as to whether any time you're asking it's acknowledged to be a settlement,

the Court is being asked to approve it and sign. I don't understand why 9019 doesn't apply.

Go ahead, Mr. Velez-Rivera.

MR. VELEZ-RIVERA: On its face, Your Honor, we haven't seen all of the papers. But we have a conceptual difficulty getting there, as well.

In any event, even assuming that hurtle can be jumped over, we still have the sealing issue before us. You Honor is being asked to place -- to exclude something from the record which underlies the stipulated order in front of you. We haven't seen either one. We can't pass on the sealing -- on the paper that's being sealed, obviously, without seeing it. And I don't think the Court can do that, either.

We have, as Your Honor knows, a longstanding vigilance over sealing motions in Your Honor's courtroom, and every other courtroom in this building. We'd like to, if the Court gets there, have an opportunity to pass on that.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Velez-Rivera.

MR. VELEZ-RIVERA: Thank you.

THE COURT: Mr. Shaev?

MR. SHAEV: Your Honor, I do have just one point I want to make in reference to the Chapter 13 trustee. I don't think anyone was alluding to the fact that the standing trustee has no position in this matter. I think the point

being made was that this is a hundred-percent payment plan, there's no plan arrearage, no creditors being affected, no party but actually the individuals involved in it. I think that was the intent of that statement.

MS. KAVA: But, Mr. Shaev, the debtor is not making his mortgage payments. Isn't that part of his budget? Isn't the trustee supposed to be aware of that? Maybe he's not making other payments to other creditors that he's supposed to be paying outside the plan.

THE COURT: But the plan Certainly provides that secured creditors are to be paid outside the plan. If the debtor doesn't do it, it's a default on the terms of the plan. While the payments don't go to the trustee, it's still — I mean, I do get lift-stay motions in post-confirmation matters where the creditor is arguing under 362(d)(1)— well, you know, they argue that they've breached the plan. That's a basis for lifting the stay. So —

MR. LESNIAK: Your Honor, may I respond further if Mr. Shaev is done?

THE COURT: Certainly, Mr. Lesniak.

MR. LESNIAK: With respect to the Chapter 13 trustee, Judge, what we're saying is that the settlement does not affect the Chapter 13 trustee. If payments aren't being made, certainly the Chapter 13 trustee would receive notice of the motion for relief. Nothing in the settlement involves

31

It's a settlement of the debtor's claim on the 1 cross-motion. 2 THE COURT: Are any payments being made to the 3 debtor or the debtor's counsel under the terms that have not 4 been disclosed to the Court? 5 MR. LESNIAK: Is a payment of money being made? 6 THE COURT: Yes. 7 MR. LESNIAK: Yes, it is, Your Honor. There's a 8 lump-sum payment of money that's being made to the debtor. 9 As to the U.S. Trustee's point, there is no sealing 10 motion here. We're not asking anything be sealed because we're not asking to file anything. 12 THE COURT: You are. You're asking -- you're 1.3 proposing to file -- here it is. I got a disk and I got an order. 15 MR. LESNIAK: We're not asking to file --16 THE COURT: And it's called stipulated order, and it 17 has a -- you've -- Mr. Wiener has signed it, Mr. Shaev has 18 signed it, and there's a place for me to sign it. 19 20 MR. LESNIAK: Your Honor, we are not asking for that Court order to be sealed. 21 THE COURT: Oh, I understand that. 22 23 MR. LESNIAK: Okay. THE COURT: It's just the terms of the settlement 24

that you don't want sealed -- that --

MR. LESNIAK: No, we don't -- we're not even providing it to -- but let me give another example. Let me go a little bit different direction to point out what we're doing here.

It would, I would suggest --

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THE COURT: Just hold on, Mr. Lesniak. Paragraph 3 of the stipulated order provides:

"In order to avoid the costs and expenses of litigation of the cross-motion, and without any admission of liability, William and Chase have entered into a settlement agreement and release with respect to the cross-motion, the terms and conditions of which the parties have agreed to keep confidential, except to the extent disclosed herein."

MR. LESNIAK: Yes. That's correct, Judge.

What I'm suggesting is this: If, after the crossmotion had been filed, and Mr. Shaev and I had our
negotiations, and Chase and Mr. Pawson agreed to a
settlement, if all Chase had done was pay X dollars to Mr.
Pawson, and Mr. Shaev had withdrawn his cross-motion, there
would be nothing pending further before the Court. And I
suggest that he could well have done that.

The only reason we're here is that Mr. Shaev said, I would like the Court to order Chase to do certain things as

part of this settlement. And we said, okay. But, certainly, if -- if Mr. Shaev had withdrawn his motion, I would suggest that the U.S. Trustee would have no objection to it, the Chapter 13 trustee would have no objection to it; it would have been what it truly was: A matter settled between the parties, Chase withdrew its MFR, Mr. Shaev would withdraw the debtor's cross-motion, and the matter would be concluded except to the extent Your Honor is interested in pursuing a rule to show cause, which is, as I mentioned earlier, certainly perfectly free to do. We're not in any way able, if we even desired to, to prevent you from doing that.

So this is really no different than that situation.

And we could have resolved this matter, and I suppose we still even could, if Mr. Shaev didn't insist on the Court's ordering things, settle it in a private way and simply withdraw the motion. And this is -- none of the parties, the Chapter 13 trustee or trustee -- U.S. Trustee, I would suggest, would have really been looking behind that to see what the settlement terms were, or why Mr. Shaev withdrew the motion, or why Chase withdrew its MFR.

Thank you, Judge.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Lesniak.

Mr. Shaev, do you want to be heard further?

MR. SHAEV: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Why did you insist on it being in an

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order approved by the Court?
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            MR. SHAEV: Well, there are terms in that order that
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   are very important to my client and myself, and under no
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   circumstances was I going to file such a cross-motion and not
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   have whatever settlement there was at least be so ordered by
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   the Court. I wasn't going to take the chance of Your Honor
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   saying we did this behind your back.
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            THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Shaev.
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            Is Chase prepared to disclose the terms, Mr.
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  Lesniak?
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            MR. LESNIAK: In camera, Your Honor?
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            THE COURT: No. On the record.
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            MR. LESNIAK: On the record?
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            THE COURT: Yes.
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            MR. LESNIAK: Can I take a moment to talk to my
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   client about that?
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            THE COURT: Yes, you can.
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            MR. LESNIAK: Thank you.
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       (Counsel confer.)
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            MR. LESNIAK: May we step outside for a moment,
   please, Judge?
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            THE COURT: Yes, please, go ahead.
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            MR. LESNIAK: Thank you.
            THE COURT: Yeah. Go ahead.
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        (Pause.)
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MR. LESNIAK: I just wanted to ask for a 1 clarification as to what the Court is asking. Are you asking 2 Chase to disclose just the amount of the settlement? Or are 3 you asking Chase to disclose the entire terms of the 4 settlement --5 THE COURT: The entire terms of the settlement. 6 MR. LESNIAK: Would that be in the form of reading 7 it on the record, or filing it? 8 THE COURT: I'm going to want to hear Mr. Velez-9 Rivera on that subject. 10 MR. LESNIAK: Okay. Then if I can, Your Honor, I 11 would ask to be able to communicate with Mr. Shaev as well 12 because the settlement agreement has certain terms about 13 confidentiality and we'd essentially be breaching the agreement. So I need to talk to him about that. 15 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Shaev said something on the 16 record last week that this wasn't his request for 17 confidentiality that was involved, it was Chase's. But let's 18 take a ten-minute break. Why don't you talk with Mr. Shaev? 19 2.0 Also talk with Mr. Velez-Rivera because I consider the U.S. -- Ms. Kava, you're in -- you can do it in here because Ms. 21 Kava is on the phone and she ought to hear this as well.

I consider the Chapter 13 trustee and the U.S. Trustee to be very important players in any decision about what happens here. I take -- I said this earlier. I mean, I

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take Judge Lynch's decision in Geltzer and my own decision in Food Management Group as dealing with the importance of transparency in the Bankruptcy Courts as essential. And just so it's clear, I am not going to approve any order where all of the terms are not disclosed. That is -- that isn't going to happen.

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MR. LESNIAK: Your Honor, may I suggest, then --

MR. LESNIAK: All right, I'm sorry.

THE COURT: Just let me finish.

THE COURT: I'm not anxious to have a protracted proceeding involving Mr. Wiener's firm and JPMorgan Chase I am very concerned, as I expressed earlier, about whether Judge Morris's message that she tried to convey in Schuessler has been heard. You've indicated changes that are being made. But, you know, I'm prepared to consider, and depending on what those terms are, approve -- consider, and if proper, approve a settlement of the matter, the terms of which are fully disclosed on the record.

And we'll take this ten-minute recess --

MR. LESNIAK: Understood, Your Honor. You may not need it. Could you give me two more minutes?

THE COURT: Well, I think it's important that you find out from Ms. Kava and Mr. Velez-Rivera what the position of the Chapter 13 trustee and the U.S. Trustee is to how this -- if you're prepared to disclose the terms on the record,

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whether you need a revised stipulation and order, whether 1 it's put on the record and a transcript being available on 2 ECF. I want to hear what the U.S. Trustee -- if Chase is 3 prepared to do that, and Mr. Shaev is prepared to do that, 4 what Ms. Kava and the U.S. Trustee have to say about it are 5 also important to me. 6 So let's take a ten-minute break. 7 MR. LESNIAK: Thank you, Judge. 8 (Recess taken at 10:53 a.m.) 9 (Proceedings resume at 11:07 a.m.) 10 THE COURT: Please be seated. 11 All right. We're back on the record in the matter 12 of In Re William Robert Pawson, Number 05-18439. 13 Mr. Lesniak? 14 MR. LESNIAK: Your Honor, if I may address the 15 Court, Chase is prepared at this point to right now read into 16 the record the entire settlement agreement and release 17 subject to a stipulation with Mr. Shaev that reading the 18 settlement agreement into the record does not constitute a 19 2.0 violation of any of the provisions of confidentiality or otherwise by either Chase or Mr. Pawson. 21 THE COURT: Mr. Shaev? 22 23 MR. SHAEV: That's agreed to, Your Honor. THE COURT: Mr. Velez-Rivera, do you want to be 24

Are you satisfied with the -- what's been proposed?

And I'm going to ask Ms. Kava as well.

MR. VELEZ-RIVERA: With respect to the single point that reading the settlement agreement into the record won't constitute a breach thereof, we take no position on that.

THE COURT: No, I'm -- that wasn't what I was asking you about, really. Whether -- you know, I'm being asked to approve an order and the settlement between Pawson and Chase. The terms will be on the record. A transcript will be prepared and posted on ECF. And my question really goes to whether you're satisfied that that sufficiently addresses the public interest in the terms of any settlement being part of the public record.

MR. VELEZ-RIVERA: I think I better answer that with the admonition that the United States Trustee, regardless of whether Your Honor approves the settlement, fully reserves her rights vis-a-vis the movant, Chase in this case.

THE COURT: So does the Court.

MR. VELEZ-RIVERA: I understood that part. Thanks, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Ms. Kava?

MS. KAVA: The Chapter 13 trustee has no opposition to, of course, the settlement being read.

THE COURT: All right. So let's proceed on that basis. Mr. Lesniak?

MR. LESNIAK: May I, Your Honor?

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THE COURT: Yes, please. 1

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MR. LESNIAK: Your Honor, what I'm reading into the record is a document entitled, "Settlement Agreement and Release." It reads as follows:

> "This settlement agreement and release ("agreement") is entered into as of this 5th day of August, 2008, between William Robert Pawson ("William") and JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. ("Chase"), and is in the following terms and conditions."

The next section is headed, "Recitals:"

"Whereas, there is presently pending in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York ("Court") that certain proceeding entitled In Re William Robert Pawson, Case Number 05-18439-MG ("bankruptcy case"), wherein William has filed a petition pursuant to Chapter 13 of the United States Bankruptcy Code, which proceeding remains pending, and whereas in the bankruptcy case, Chase heretofore filed a motion for relief from the automatic stay ("MFR") which MFR has been withdrawn, and, whereas, in the bankruptcy case, William has filed a response to motion for relief from the automatic stay and cross-motion pursuant to Bankruptcy Code Section 105 and 28 U.S.C. 1927 ("cross-motion"), which crossmotion remains pending and undetermined, and whereas

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Chase has denied any liability in connection with the cross-motion, and whereas William and Chase desire to fully settle, compromise and otherwise resolve their dispute with respect to the crossmotion and agree that it is in their respective best interests to compromise their dispute with respect to the cross-motion, specifically including the avoidance of the costs, expenses and inconvenience of litigation, and whereas William and his wife Janet Pawson ("Janet") have heretofore executed a 10 certain cooperative apartment fixed rate note dated 11 November 7, 2003, payable to Chase ("note"), 12 together with a loan security agreement dated 13 November 7, 2003 in favor of Chase ("mortgage")." 14 Then the next section is headed, "Settlement 15 Provisions." 16

"Now, therefore, for good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged, including without limitation the representations, promises and agreements set forth herein, and the limited joinder in this agreement by Janet and by David Shaev ("David"), as set forth herein below, the parties hereto agree as follows:

"Paragraph 1: Settlement payment. Within ten days

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of the execution of this agreement, Chase will pay to William the sum of fifty thousand and zero onehundreds dollars, \$50,000, by cashier's check upon execution of this agreement. Said payment shall be made payable to David, William's attorney. Said payment is intended to constitute a full and complete resolution of the cross-motion and any matters related to the cross-motion or the MFR, whether raised by William or otherwise. Accordingly, in the event the Court sua sponte orders any monetary payment to be made by Chase to or for the benefit of William or David on account of the cross-motion or the MFR (separate and apart from the Court's approval of this agreement), then the amount paid under this paragraph will be offset against the amounts ordered to be paid by the Court. If necessary to comply with this paragraph, William will return to Chase the payment referred to in the first sentence of this agreement to the extent, and only to the extent that Chase is otherwise obligated to pay any sum to William and/or David pursuant to an order of the Court. As an example, if the Court sua sponte enters an award to William of \$20,000, said \$20,000 will be offset against the \$50,000 paid pursuant to the first sentence of this paragraph,

and Chase will owe nothing more to William, or, as another example, if the Court sua sponte orders Chase to pay William \$60,000, then \$50,000 of that \$60,000 would be deemed paid pursuant to this paragraph, and Chase would only owe William an additional \$10,000.

"Paragraph 2: Credit reporting repair. Within thirty days from the date hereof, Chase will take any and all action required or necessary to remove any negative credit reporting made by Chase to any credit reporting agency as to William and/or Janet regarding payments due under the note for May 2008 and June 2008.

"Paragraph 3: Current loan information. Within ten days from the date of this agreement, Chase will provide to William a current transaction history for the loan represented by the note and mortgage, together with a then current payoff statement for said loan. Chase shall be deemed to have complied with this Paragraph 3 if it provides the information to David.

"Paragraph 4: Qualified written request. In the event that William or Janet makes a qualified written request pursuant to 12 U.S.C. Section 2605, it is deemed to be made separate and apart from this

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agreement, and Chase's response thereto shall be made separate and apart from this agreement, provided, however, that William and Janet agree that if a qualified written request is made by or on behalf of either of them with respect to the loan represented by the note and mortgage, it will made to the attention of James P. Berg, Vice President and Assistant General Counsel, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., Chase Home Finance Division, 194 Wood Avenue South, Second Floor, Iselin, New Jersey -- " I hope 10 I pronounced that correct, Judge -- "08830. 11 Paragraph Number 5 entitled "Waiver of charges 12 13

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related to MFR:"

"Chase agrees that no charges (such as filing fees or attorneys' fees) with respect to the MFR will be added to or charged to the loan represented by the note and mortgage, and any such fees and costs are specifically waived as to William and Janet.

"Paragraph 6: Withdrawal of MFR. As noted in the foregoing recitals, the MFR has been heretofore withdrawn. Chase represents that the MFR has been withdrawn with prejudice as to any payments due under the note prior to August 1, 2008, but not as to any payments coming due on the note after August 1, 2008.

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"Paragraph Number 7: Post-discharge Notification. In the event William receives a discharge in the Bankruptcy case, within thirty days after the entry of the order of discharge Chase will provide to William written notice by regular first class mail of any outstanding fees or costs assessed to the loan account represented by the note and mortgage (such as late charges, property inspection fees, attorneys' fees, or filing fees not otherwise waived pursuant to Paragraph 5 of this agreement). rights of William and/or Janet to contest any such fees or costs are fully preserved herein. If Chase fails to give the written notice provided for in the first sentence of this paragraph, then all such fees or costs, if any, shall be deemed waived by Chase. Chase shall be deemed to have complied with this Paragraph 7 if it provides the information to David. "Paragraph 8: Confidentiality. William, Janet and David hereby agree, except to the extent required to comply with this agreement or to secure the approval of the Bankruptcy Court after proper notice and a hearing, or pursuant to a subpoena or as otherwise may be required by any applicable law, rule, or regulation not to directly or indirectly disclose, divulge, publicize or publish to any other entity or

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individual for any purpose the terms of this agreement, except and only to the extent of the existence of this agreement and the terms that may be set forth in any Court order entered in the Bankruptcy case pursuant to this agreement. Notwithstanding the preceding sentence, disclosure of the settlement amount to the Bankruptcy Court may only be made in the manner that is not in the public record (such as in chambers). In the event William, Janet or David is asked about this case, he/she may state that the matter has been resolved by the mutual agreement of the parties and refer to the official court record. Notwithstanding the preceding, William may disclose the terms of this agreement to his attorney, to those employees and contract assistants employed by his attorney who need to know the terms of this agreement in order to perform their job assignments or tasks assigned to them, his accountant, any state or federal agency in connection with the requirement to file any annual or periodic reports, and tax preparers, as necessary. William, Janet and David agree that he/she will not provide information or testimony in any legal action against Chase concerning the terms of this agreement except pursuant to a subpoena, and

that he/she will notify Chase within five business days of any subpoena or informal request to testify that he or she receives. Such notice may be given by e-mail addressed to James P. Berg at JimPBerg@JPMorganChase.com, by facsimile addressed to James P. Berg at 732-452-8035, or by a letter mailed by certified mail, return receipt requested, to James P. Berg, Vice President and Assistant General Counsel, JPMorgan Chase Bank, Chase Home Finance Division, 194 Wood Avenue South, Second Floor, Iselin, New Jersey, 08830. In the event of a letter, notice shall be deemed given on the date of the postmark on the letter. Nothing in this agreement will prohibit or restrict William, Janet or David from providing information or otherwise testifying or assisting in any governmental or regulatory investigation. In making any permitted disclosure pursuant to this Paragraph 8, William, Janet and/or David will also inform the recipient of the disclosure that the terms and conditions of this agreement are subject to the provisions of a confidentiality agreement, and are to be kept confidential by the recipient. It is expressly understood and agreed that this confidentiality provision is an essential provision of this

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agreement.

"Paragraph 9: Withdrawal of Cross-motion. Upon execution of this agreement, William will promptly withdraw the cross-motion with prejudice in the bankruptcy case. Withdrawal of the cross-motion will be accomplished by a stipulated order in a form to be agreed upon by William and Chase, which order shall include language that orders Chase to comply with the provisions of Paragraphs 2, 3, 5, 6 and 7. However, the amount of the payment set forth in Paragraph 1 of this agreement shall only be disclosed to the Court in the bankruptcy case in accordance with the provisions of Paragraph 8 hereinabove."

Paragraph 10, entitled, "Release regarding cross-

motion:"

"William hereby releases, acquits and forever discharges Chase, its current and former affiliates, predecessors, successors, assigns, and all of their respective current and former agents, directors, officers, and employees from all actual, consequential, and exemplary damage, loss, claims, demands, expenses, liabilities, obligations, actions and causes of action whatsoever which he may now have or claim to have against Chase relative to or

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related to the cross-motion and/or the obligations set forth in the cross-motion.

"Paragraph 11: Release regarding credit reporting. Provided that Chase complies with Paragraph 2 of the agreement, William and Janet hereby release, acquit and forever discharge Chase, its current and former affiliates, predecessors, successors, assigns, and all of their respective current and former agents, directors, officers, and employees from all actual, consequential, and exemplary damages, loss, claims, demands, expenses, liabilities, obligations, actions and causes of action whatsoever which he or she may now have or claim to have against Chase relative to or related to any credit reporting by Chase to any credit reporting agency solely with respect to the payments due May 2008 and June 2008 under the note. "Paragraph 12: Counterparts and signatures. agreement may be signed in counterparts and which, taken together, shall constitute a binding and enforceable agreement in accordance with its terms and conditions. A facsimile or .pdf signature sent via facsimile with a confirmation receipt or by email as evidence of same shall be deemed an original counterpart for purposes of this agreement.

"Paragraph 13: Binding agreement. This agreement

1	shall enure to the benefit of and be binding upon
2	the successors and assigns of the parties hereto.
3	"Paragraph 14: Professional fees. Each of the
4	parties hereto shall bear and be responsible for his
5	or its own professional fees, including without
6	limitation, attorneys' fees in connection with this
7	agreement."
8	Paragraph 15, entitled, "The entire agreement."
9	"This agreement represents and constitutes the
10	entire agreement and understanding between the
11	parties, the subject matter hereof, and all previous
12	statements or understandings, whether expressed or
13	implied, oral or written, shall be superseded by
14	this agreement. Any modifications of this agreement
15	must be in writing and signed by the parties
16	affected by such modifications.
17	"Paragraph 16: Governing law. This agreement shall
18	be interpreted and the rights and liabilities of the
19	parties hereto shall be determined in accordance
20	with the internal laws (as opposed to conflicts of
21	law provisions) of the State of New York.
22	"In witness whereof, the parties hereto voluntarily
23	and intending to be bound thereby do execute these
24	presence this 5th day of August, 2008."
25	There's a signature line, "Executed by JPMorgan

Chase Bank, N.A. by Thomas E. Reardon (phonetic), its 1 assistant vice president." 2 There's a signature line, "Executed by William 3 Robert Pawson." 4 We're almost done, Judge. There's one --5 THE COURT: It's okay, Mr. Lesniak. 6 MR. LESNIAK: -- additional paragraph. 7 called, "Limited joinder of parties." And it reads: 8 "For good and valuable consideration, the receipt 9 and sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged, 10 including but not limited to Chase's execution of 11 the foregoing agreement with William, Janet Pawson 12 executes this agreement for the limited purpose of 13 being bound by the provisions of Paragraphs 4, 8 and 14 11, and David Shaev executes this agreement for the 15 limited purpose of being bound by the provisions of 16 Paragraph 8." 17 There are then signatures by Janet Pawson and David 18 That is the agreement in its entirety, Your Honor. Shaev. 19 20 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Lesniak. Now let me ask whether the U.S. Trustee or the 21 Chapter 13 trustee wishes to be heard with respect to whether the Court should approve the order. 23 Let me say that, with respect to the order that was 24

-- the stipulated order submitted to the Court, I have added

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the following at the end of Paragraph 3. Let me -- I think 1 Mr. Velez-Rivera doesn't have it. Paragraph 3 in the text 2 that's there reads, quote: 3 "In order to avoid the costs and expenses of 4 litigation of the cross-motion and without any 5 admission of liability, William and Chase have 6 entered into a settlement agreement and release 7 (agreement) with respect to the cross-motion, the 8 terms and conditions of which the parties have 9 agreed to keep confidential, except to the extent 10 disclosed herein." 11 Immediately following thereafter, in brackets, I 12 have added: 13 "All terms of the settlement were disclosed on the 14 record in open court on August 13, 2008. A copy of 15 the transcript will be prepared and posted on ECF." 16 Close bracket, and then my initials following it. 17 Mr. Velez-Rivera, do you want to be heard with 18 respect to whether the Court should provide -- give its 19 approval to the order? 20 MR. VELEZ-RIVERA: Your Honor, I have to reiterate 21 something once, that the --22 THE COURT: Without prejudice to whatever rights the 23 U.S. Trustee --24

MR. VELEZ-RIVERA: And I need to be very precise

about that, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. VELEZ-RIVERA: The settlement, in the event approved by the Court, from my client's perspective does not prejudice the right of the United States Trustee to take action against Chase to the extent the United States Trustee deems it appropriate under 28 U.S.C. Section 586 and Section 307 of the Bankruptcy Code.

There were a couple of features, hearing them for the first time, Your Honor, and not being able to read them makes them a little difficult to absorb. But it appeared that at least one of the provisions can be construed as tying the Court's hands with respect to the payment and the offsetting mechanism later on. I'll leave that up to Your Honor because we were listening to it, and we only got that one shot.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. VELEZ-RIVERA: And that might not be the case.

But in the event it does do that, we think it is an inappropriate provision.

And then, finally, we may seek the debtor's cooperation later on under a variety of federal statutes, including the Right to Financial Privacy Act. We would like that, in the event the settlement is approved, that the order make clear that it should not interfere with the exercise of

my client's rights under that federal statute, among others, or be deemed to limit the debtor's ability to cooperate with my office, including giving testimony before this Court.

That's all I have, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you. Ms. Kava?

MS. KAVA: I'm going to go along with everything that the U.S. Trustee said. My only question is all those paragraphs about the debtors keeping confidential all the terms of the agreement and not to reveal all these things, it seems to me that that's all moot now that it's on the record.

THE COURT: Well, it's in -- what's been read is an agreement. The terms of the settlement are all now part of the public record.

MS. KAVA: Exactly. So all those terms are pretty much meaningless since they already are now part of the public record.

THE COURT: Well, they're in a written agreement that was signed by the parties. I think once matters are fully disclosed on the record, so much for the confidentiality.

MS. KAVA: Right. The trustee is fine with the terms of it, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Lesniak, Mr. Velez-Rivera raised the issue about the debtor's cooperation with the U.S. Trustee. The stipulation is you -- the settlement,

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as you read it, had a provision that required a subpoena.
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            Is it your position that in order for the debtor to
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   cooperate with the U.S. Trustee if I approve this order, they
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   would be required to only cooperate if they receive a
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   subpoena?
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            MR. LESNIAK: If you give me a moment, Your Honor.
6
   I thought there was a provision that addressed that.
7
            It says -- I think it said that if they gave -- got
8
   a subpoena, they'd have to notify us. But there's a
9
   paragraph -- a sentence that says, "Nothing in this agreement
10
   will prohibit or restrict William, Janet or David from
11
   providing information or otherwise testifying or assisting in
12
   any governmental or regulatory investigation."
13
            THE COURT: All right, thank you.
14
            MR. LESNIAK: I think that covers it, Your Honor.
15
            THE COURT: I think it does. Mr. Velez-Rivera, are
16
   you comfortable having heard that again?
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            MR. VELEZ-RIVERA: If the phrase "governmental
18
   investigation" is construed broadly, then I'm okay.
19
20
            THE COURT: I would certainly construe it as
   including your office.
21
                                Thank you, Your Honor.
            MR. VELEZ-RIVERA:
22
            THE COURT: You're part of the Department of
23
   Justice.
24
            MR. LESNIAK: Your Honor, if I may, I just had -- it
25
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was our intention to settle this matter on a private basis without restricting anyone's rights, any public official, and as you can see, clearly contemplating that the Court would have the ability to take action on its own. So we are not intending to, by our private agreement, restrict what the U.S. Trustee or the Chapter 13 trustee does.

2.0

THE COURT: Right. I'm going to go ahead and approve the order as submitted, with the addition to Paragraph 3 that I read into the record.

Now I expressed my concern earlier. As Mr. Shaev has demonstrated in this and other matters, he's extremely capable and able of representing his clients' interests. The bigger concern to me, Mr. Lesniak, as I explained, are pro se debtors and debtors who are represented by counsel who are less able or willing to defend themselves.

You had indicated that Chase has changed its internal procedures. And, obviously, the U.S. Trustee's Office will determine what, if anything, they're going to do further.

I am not anxious to enter an order to show cause and launch a protracted proceeding, but what I would like to do is this. I would like to ask Mr. Lesniak and Mr. Wiener and Mr. Berg, in-house counsel at Chase, to confer with Mr. Velez-Rivera and Mr. Zipes from the U.S. Trustee's Office came in, didn't make an appearance on the record, came in

when the hearing was underway -- confer with Mr. Velez-Rivera and Mr. Zipes. If the U.S. Trustee chooses to pursue this issue informally, at least -- it's all well and good, Mr. Lesniak, for you to state on the record what procedures Chase has now put in place since the cross-motion in Pawson was filed, but that has no teeth to it.

As I indicated, this was clearly a motion to lift the automatic stay that never should have been filed, and one or two phone calls would have made that imminently clear. What I would like to give you, Mr. Lesniak and representatives of the U.S. Trustee, two weeks to discuss the matter and see whether you're able to -- on behalf of Chase, and Mr. Berg, you're here and it's very important that you be involved -- that Chase be prepared to document procedures that will be followed certainly in the Southern District of New York with respect to lift-stay motions and other matters.

Obviously, I can't at this stage require or compel Chase to do anything. I'm not trying to do that. But what I'm asking is if two weeks from today I would say -- what's the date of that? Yes, by 5 p.m. August 27th, I would like to receive a letter from you, Mr. Lesniak, indicating whether -- what the status of matters, whether you're able to reach any resolution of the issues that are of concern to me with the U.S. Trustee's Office, and I'll decide -- so I'm not going to enter any order to show cause now. I'll await

hearing whether you're able to deal with this matter with the U.S. Trustee and, if appropriate, if you've reached agreement and the U.S. Trustee wants to bring it back to me in this case, I think that's appropriate. There certainly have been other matters -- sanction matters, Mr. Lesniak, where the U.S. Trustee's Office has, after I've entered an order to show cause, has pursued matters and worked out agreements with counsel, in fact, and brought it to the Court for approval. And while it was entered in a specific case, the order was more, you know, broader in its effect.

I'm not out on any witch hunt. I want to make that crystal clear. But what I am very concerned about is what I said. I mean, if Chase has adopted satisfactory procedures — look, mistakes happen, things happen. That's — nothing is going to be — I don't think anything is going to be error free. But what concerns me is, after reading <u>Schuessler</u> when Judge Morris published it, having seen the papers here, it's kind of two strikes. Three strikes and you're out, frankly.

So if you've reached some agreement with the U.S.

Trustee and bring that back, that's fine; if not, I'll

decide. You don't have to go into details about the

discussions with the U.S. Trustee. I just need to know

whether you've reached some agreement. If not, tell me that,

and I'll decide whether to enter an order to show cause at

that time.

2.0

If I decide not to, the one thing I want to make crystal clear on the record today is -- and you better look at whatever in the next -- I don't know what's coming up in front of me next week as a Chapter 13 day. I don't know whether I have any lift-stay motions from Chase that are coming on next Thursday. But you better look and find out. And somebody better look and see whether the factual basis for any motion is a solid one. I will absolutely flyspeck any papers that are before me in any lift-stay motions in which Chase is the moving party.

I want to make clear, we're -- 362 is there for the protection of creditors and I regularly grant motions to lift stay when it's appropriate. You know, I'll do so with respect to Chase. But I want to be sure that they're right. So see what you're able to -- if you're not prepared to discuss it with the U.S. Trustee, or if they don't want to discuss it with Chase, that's fine. But I'm going to sort of allow this two-week window. If you're in, you know, continuing to have discussions and you want some more time, if you can agree on that with the U.S. Trustee, August is a difficult time to get things done, but if, you know, you can -- and, obviously, copy the U.S. Trustee on the letter you send to the Court.

Anybody else have anything they want to raise? Mr. Velez-Rivera, or Mr. Shaev? Go ahead, Mr. Shaev.

MR. SHAEV: Just one thing. I'd like for counsel 1 for debtor, myself, to be cc'd on any correspondence --2 THE COURT: That's fine. 3 MR. SHAEV: -- during this transaction period. 4 THE COURT: I would agree with that, Mr. Shaev. 5 Mr. Velez-Rivera? 6 MR. VELEZ-RIVERA: Your Honor, I'll volunteer --7 THE COURT: I didn't mean to put the burden on you -8 9 MR. VELEZ-RIVERA: That's okay. 10 THE COURT: -- on this, but --11 MR. VELEZ-RIVERA: Oh, no, that's okay. 12 We will endeavor to send the Court a letter also on 13 the 27th at 5 o'clock so you know where we are. It's the end of August. We need to wait for a transcript. So I can also 15 see myself asking you for more time. 16 THE COURT: That's fine. If, in two weeks -- look, 17 if you've had a discussion and you're not getting anywhere, 18 let me know that and then I'll decide what to do. But if 19 you've had some discussions and you think more time is 2.0

needed, I'm going to be amenable to giving you more time. 21 I'm not anxious to enter -- at this stage, to enter an order to show cause and launch a whole evidentiary hearing. But if 23

Mr. Lesniak?

I have to, we'll do it.

25

MR. LESNIAK: Your Honor, if I may, any letter that 1 we would send in to the Court would be one that would either 2 be jointly with the trustee, or certainly would be seen and 3 approved by the trustee beforehand. 4 THE COURT: I understand. 5 MR. LESNIAK: We're not going to --6 THE COURT: I understand. Whether I get one letter 7 or two letters, that's fine. You work it out between you. 8 Okay? 9 MR. LESNIAK: We will, Judge. 10 THE COURT: Anything else I need to address today? 11 All right, we're adjourned. Thank you very much, everybody. 12 (Proceedings concluded at 11:40 a.m.) 13 **** 14 CERTIFICATION 15 I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript 16 from the electronic sound recording of the proceedings in the 17 above-entitled matter to the best of my knowledge and ability. 18 19 Catheywa Lynch 20 21 August 13, 2008 22 Cathryn Lynch, NJ Cert. No. 565 23 Certified Court Transcriptionist 24

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